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Abstract—This paper aims at precisely detecting and identi-
fying anomalous events in IP traffic. To this end, we adopt the
link stream formalism which properly captures temporal and
structural features of the data. Within this framework, we focus
on finding anomalous behaviours with respect to the degree of IP
addresses over time. Due to diversity in IP profiles, this feature
is typically distributed heterogeneously, preventing us to directly
find anomalies. To deal with this challenge, we design a method
to detect outliers as well as precisely identify their cause in a
sequence of similar heterogeneous distributions. We apply it to
several MAWI captures of IP traffic and we show that it succeeds
in detecting relevant patterns in terms of anomalous network
activity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Temporal and structural features of IP traffic are and have
been for several years the subject of multiple studies in
various fields. A significant part of this research is devoted
to detecting statistically anomalous traffic subsets referred to
as anomalies, events or outliers. Their detection is particularly
important since, in addition to a better understanding of IP
traffic characteristics, it could prevent attacks against on-line
services, networks and information systems.
Due to the temporal and structural nature of IP traffic, de-
veloped methods can be classified into two categories: those
based on signal processing [7], [10], and those based on
graph theory [27], [50]. However, methods within these areas
lead to a loss of information: by considering interactions
as a signal, the structure is aggregated; with graphs, the
temporal order of interactions is lost. Hence, existing methods
struggle to identify subtle outliers, which are abnormal both in
time and structure. Moreover, when they succeed, the loss of
information leads to a decrease of accuracy. In this paper, we
model IP traffic as a link stream which fully captures both the
temporal and the structural nature of traffic [28], [44]. Then,
we introduce a method in order to detect subtle outliers and
precisely identify which IP addresses and instants caused it.
More specifically, a link stream L is defined as a set of
instants T , a set of nodes V (IP addresses) and a set of
interactions E (communication between IP addresses over
time). Within this framework, we focus on one key property:
the degree of nodes. This feature is highly heterogeneous,
which raises challenges for its use in outlier detection, but
it is stable over time. Our method takes advantage of this
temporal homogeneity: it divides the link stream into time
slices and then performs outlier detection to find time slices
which exhibit unusual number of nodes having a degree within
specific degree classes. Then, in order to isolate responsible IP
addresses and instants on which they behave unexpectedly, we
design an identification method based on an iterative removal
of previously detected events. Finally, we validate our method
by showing that these event removals do not significantly alter
the underlying normal traffic.
This paper is an extended version of the work published
in [49]. In this contribution, special attention is paid to the
importance of parameters involved in the method such as time
slice and degree class sizes. Moreover, in addition to our
previous work in which we evaluated our method on a one-
hour long IP traffic trace of June 2013, we apply it on two
other datasets: a one-day long IP traffic trace of June 2013 and
a fifteen-minutes long IP traffic trace of November 2018 which
possesses a list of abnormal events indexed by MAWILab to
which we compare our results [17].
The paper is organised as follows. We overview the related
work in Section II and present our contributions in Section
III. We introduce IP traffic modelling as a link stream and the
degree definition in Section IV. In Section V, we describe
our goals and the challenges they raise. This leads to the
development of our method to detect events in Section VI
and to identify them in Section VII. We discuss our results
in Section VIII. Subsequently, we apply our method on other
datasets in Section IX. Then, we investigate the influence of
different time slice sizes and different class constructions in
Section X. We conclude in Section XI.
II. RELATED WORK
Techniques for anomaly detection in IP traffic are extremely
diverse. Among those, methods using principal component
analysis [26], [40], machine learning [48], data mining [29],
signal analysis [7], [10] and graph-based techniques have
been proposed. In this paper, we focus our related work on
methods based on dynamic graphs. In this domain, authors
traditionally study a sequence of graphs {Gi}i=1..k, such
that each snapshot Gi = Giτ..(i+1)τ contains interactions
aggregated over time window Ti = [iτ, (i + 1)τ [. Then,
they attribute an abnormality score to each snapshot Gi by
comparing it to others. This problem has been approached in
various ways depending on the definition of the abnormality
score (for surveys, see [4], [39]).
Compression-based abnormality scores analyse the
evolution of the encoding cost of each graph to detect
anomalies. Sun et al. [43] and Duan et al. [15] group
similar consecutive snapshots into a chain. If the adding
of a graph greatly increases the description length of the
chain, the corresponding snapshot is considered as abnormal.
Chakrabarti et al. [12] use a similar technique but apply it on
clusters of nodes to find abnormal links.
Other approaches use tensor decomposition. Ide et al. [23]
and Ishibashi et al. [24] build a past activity vector from the
main eigenvectors associated to all snapshots within a given
time window. Then, snapshot Gi is identified as abnormal
when the distance between the past activity vector and Gi’s
main eigenvector exceeds a certain threshold. Akoglu et al.
[3] use a similar technique in which the past activity vector
includes nodes local features.
Outliers can also be found by studying communities evolution.
Aggarwal et al. [2] find anomalous snapshots by comparing
their clustering quality. Gupta et al. [20], [19] calculate the
variation in the probability of belonging to a community for
each node between two consecutive snapshots. Nodes for
which the variation deviates significantly from the average
variation of nodes within the same community are considered
abnormal. Chen et al. [14] and Araujo et al. [5], in turn,
detect abnormal communities among clusters which unusually
increase, merge, decrease or split.
Finally, a significant amount of work quantify the distance
between snapshots using graph features. Pincombe et al. [36]
and Papadimitriou et al. [35] define a series of topological
aggregated features to compare snapshots. Berlingerio et al.
[9] use the moments of an egonet feature – e.g., degree,
clustering coefficient – calculated on each node. Saxena et al.
[41] use a similar method but decompose each snapshot into
k cores to consider global features as well. Schieber et al.
[42] use the Jensen-Shannon divergence and a measure of the
heterogeneity of each graphs in terms of connectivity distance
between nodes. Finally, Mongiovi et al. [33] find clusters of
anomalous links by calculating, for each link, its probability
to have a given weight according to its usual behaviour.
However, these techniques lead to a loss of information:
by reducing interactions into a sequence of graphs, the links
order of arrival within a time window is lost. To overcome
this issue, other work propose to improve these methods by
introducing sequences of augmented graphs. For instance,
Casteigts et al. [11] and Batagelj et al. [8] use graphs in
which links are labelled with their instants of occurrence.
Likewise, in [6], [46] and [47], authors use causal graphs
in which two nodes are linked together if there is a causal
relationship between them. In this paper, we adopt a new
perspective. We consider temporal interactions as a separate
object called a link stream, using the formalism developed by
Latapy et al. [28]. While methods for covering relevant and
subtle events often go hand in hand with very complicated
features, we show that we can find relevant structural and
temporal outliers, as well as gain accuracy, with a very
simple feature defined in the link stream formalism: the
instantaneous degree of nodes over time.
Other authors detect outliers using this modelling. Yu et
al. [51] calculate the main eigenvector of the ego-network of
each node and find abnormal nodes among those experiencing
a sudden change in the amplitude and/or direction of their
vectors. Manzoor et al. [31] use a similar technique. They
store the link stream in a sketch built from the ego-networks
patterns of each node and label a new edge as abnormal
if the difference between the sketch before its arrival and
the one after is significant. Ranshous et al. [38] also use
sketches. They store the link stream in a Count Min sketch
that approximates the frequency of links and nodes. From
this sketch, they assign an abnormality score to each link
(u, v, t) based on prior occurrences, preferential attachment
and mutual neighbours of nodes u and v. Eswaran et al. [16]
also rely on approximations and attribute a score to every
new edge arriving in the stream by relying on a sub-stream
L′ sampled from past edges. If the new edge connects parts
of L′ which are sparsely connected, then it is considered as
abnormal. Finally, Viard et al. [44] find anomalous bipartite
cliques using the link stream formalism developed in [28].
A large proportion of the methods cited above is devoted
to find globally anomalous instants (as abnormal snapshots).
Among those extracting local features on nodes or links,
either authors use similarity functions which aggregate local
information, or they rely on approximations as samples or
sketches. In the first case, instants are abnormal based on
their local patterns but information about which sub-graphs
are responsible is lost. In the second case, approximations
allow a fast processing but lead to a decrease of accuracy. In
contrast, our method identify abnormal couples (t, v) exactly,
without any information loss and still exhibits fast and efficient
processing.
III. CONTRIBUTIONS
We model IP traffic with a link stream and study one of its
most important properties, the degree of nodes over time. We
show that, although this property follows a very heterogeneous
distribution that is hard to model, this distribution is stable
over time. We then design a method that exploits the stability
of this heterogeneity for anomaly detection, and may be
applied in various such situations. This method first splits
traffic into time slices and computes the degree distribution
in each slice. By comparing these distributions, the method
then points out degree classes and time slices such that having
a degree in this class during this slice is anomalous. Using
this information, we identify IP addresses and time periods
involved in anomalies, as well as the corresponding traffic.
By removing this traffic from the original data, we validate
our identification by noticing that we turn back to a normal
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Fig. 1: Link stream for the modelling of IP traffic - (a)
Example of a link stream L = (T, V,E) formed from the
set of triplets D = {(1, a, b), (1.5, a, b), (3.5, a, c), (4.3, b, c),
(4.4, b, c), (4.6, b, c), (4.9, b, c), (5.3, b, c), (6.1, a, b)}: T = [0, 7[,
V = {a, b, c}, E = ( [0.5, 2[ ∪ [5.5, 6.5[ )×{ab} ∪ [3, 4[×{ac} ∪
[3.8, 5.8[ × {bc}. In the example, a interacts with b from t1 = 0.5
to t2 = 2. (b) Time evolution of the degree of node b.
traffic with respect to the degree. We illustrate the method and
its outcome on MAWI public IP traffic.
IV. TRAFFIC MODELLED AS A LINK STREAM
IP traffic consists of packet exchanges between IP
addresses. We use here one hour of IP traffic capture from the
MAWI archive1 on June 25th, 2013, from 00:00 to 01:00. We
denote this trace by a set D of triplets such that (t, u, v) ∈ D
indicates that IP addresses u and v exchanged a packet at
time t. The set D contains 83, 386, 538 triplets involving
1, 157, 540 different IP addresses.
We model this traffic as a link stream L in order to capture its
structure and dynamics [28]. Nodes are IP addresses involved
in D and two nodes are linked together from time t1 to time
t2 if they exchanged at least one packet every second within
this time interval. Formally, L = (T, V,E) is defined by a
time interval T ⊂ R, a set of nodes V and a set of links
E ⊆ T × V ⊗ V where V ⊗ V denotes the set of unordered
pairs of distinct elements of V , denoted by uv for any u
and v in V (thus, uv ∈ V ⊗ V implies that u, v ∈ V and
u 6= v, and we make no distinction between uv and vu). If
(t, uv) ∈ E, then u and v are linked together at time t. In
our case, we take E = ∪(t,u,v)∈D [t − ∆2 , t +
∆
2 ] × {uv}
with ∆ = 1s. Other choices can be made. For instance, we
can set a value of ∆ that is different for each uv, or each
link (t, uv), using external knowledge. We can also use a
value of ∆ that changes over time (see for instance the work
of Le´o et al. [30]). These operations are depicted in Figure 1.a.
The degree of (t, v) ∈ T ×V , denoted by dt(v), is the number
of distinct nodes with which v interacts at time t:
dt(v) = |{u : (t, uv) ∈ E}|.
1http://mawi.wide.ad.jp/mawi/ditl/ditl2013/ [25]
Figure 1.b shows the degree of node b over time. Notice that
the degree of b is not its number of exchanged packets over
time; it accounts for its number of distinct neighbours over
time.
V. HETEROGENEITY OF DEGREES
In order to find outliers in a link stream using the degree,
we first need to characterize the normal behaviour of the set
of observations O = {dt(v) : (t, v) ∈ T × V }. Then, an
outlier is a couple (t, v) ∈ T × V which has a significantly
different degree from others.
For this purpose, we call degree distribution of L the fraction
f(k) of couples (t, v) ∈ T × V for which dt(v) = k, for all
k ∈ N:
f(k) =
|{(t, v) ∈ T × V : dt(v) = k}|
|T × V |
.
Figure 2 shows that the degree distribution is very
heterogeneous, which discards the hypothesis of a normal
behaviour. In this situation, one may hardly identify values
of degree that could be considered anomalous.
A solution is to fit this distribution, and then find values
which deviates from the model. Given its heterogeneity, one
may think that it is well fitted by a power law distribution
P (k) ∝ k−α where α > 1 and kmax > k > kmin > 0.
However, we show that this is not the case following the
procedure proposed by Virkar et al. [45]. Results show
that differences between the empirical distribution and
the estimated model cannot be attributed to statistical
fluctuations, which leads us to reject the hypothesis that
the degree is distributed according to a power law distribution.
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Fig. 2: Degree distribution and complementary cumulative de-
gree distribution in L. For all (t, v) ∈ T × V , we compute
the degree dt(v) and plot the distribution of the set of values
O = {dt(v) : (t, v) ∈ T×V }. The fraction expresses the probability
to draw a time instant t ∈ T and a node v ∈ V such that dt(v) = k.
This shows that finding outliers in this type of distribution
is not trivial. In order to circumvent this issue, we observe
degrees on sub-streams corresponding to IP traffic during time
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Fig. 3: Degree distribution and complementary cumulative
degree distribution over 2-second time slices. For T0 = [0, 2[,
T1 = [2, 4[, T2 = [4, 6[ and T3 = [6, 8[, we compute the degree
dt(v) for all (t, v) in the corresponding sub-stream and plot the
distribution of the set of values Oi = {dt(v) : (t, v) ∈ Ti × V },
for i = {0, 1, 2, 3}. The fraction expresses the probability to draw a
time instant t ∈ Ti and a node v ∈ V such that dt(v) = k.
slices of duration τ = 2.0s. Formally, we call Ti = [2i, 2i+2[
the ith time slice, for all i ∈ {0, . . . , 1799}, and we define
fi(k) =
|{(t, v) ∈ Ti × V : dt(v) = k}|
|Ti × V |
,
the degree distribution of the ith time slice. Figure 3 shows
that these distributions still are heterogeneous.
Nonetheless, Figure 3 also shows that degree distributions fi
have similar shapes. To quantify this similarity, we perform
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests on all pairs
of distributions (fi, fj)i6=j [37]. According to the relative
position between the KS distance Di,j and a critical value
c, this test assess whether two samples may come from the
same distribution or not. Let m = kimax and n = k
j
max, be
the sizes of the two samples. With a significance level of
0.1, c = 1.073
√
n+m
nm
[1]. Figure 4 shows the ratio between
Di,j and c. Most Di,j are below c. This means that most
samples Oi = {dt(v) : (t, v) ∈ Ti × V } are drawn from the
same distribution. On the contrary, some of them are different
from all others which in turn, indicate changes in the overall
behaviour on particular sub-streams.
Using these observations, we design below an outlier detec-
tion method based on the temporal homogeneity of heteroge-
neous degree distributions.
VI. LEVERAGING TEMPORAL HOMOGENEITY TO DETECT
EVENTS
The above observations lead to the following conclusion:
degree distributions are heterogeneous in the same way on
most, if not all, time slices. In other words, in each time
slice, the fraction of couples (t, v) that have a given degree is
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Fig. 4: Similarity of degree distributions over 2-seconds time
slices. For all pairs of degree distributions (fi, fj)i6=j , we compute
the ratio between the KS distance Di,j and the critical value c.
We plot the distribution of the set of ratios Di,j/c for i, j ∈
{0, . . . , 1799}, i 6= j. We can see that most values are below 1
meaning that most KS distances are smaller than c. Accordingly,
based on the two sample KS test, most degree distributions are
similarly distributed. On the other hand, 1% of the ratios are larger
than 1, which is the result of the comparison between some deviating
distributions and all others.
similar to this fraction in other time slices. This is what we
will consider as normal. Anomalies, instead, correspond to
significant deviation from the usual fraction of nodes having
a given degree. In this section we describe our method to
compare degree distributions on all time slices and its use for
outlier detection.
First, notice that it makes little sense to consider the fraction
of couples (t, v) having a degree exactly k when k is large:
having degree k− 1 or k+1 makes no significant difference.
Therefore, to increase the likelihood of observing values in the
tail of the distribution, we define logarithmic degree classes
Cj and consider the fraction of couples (t, v) having degrees
in Cj , for all j:
fi(Cj) =
|{(t, v) ∈ Ti × V : dt(v) ∈ Cj}|
|Ti × V |
.
We define the jth degree class, Cj = {⌈kj⌉, . . . , ⌊kj+1⌋ − 1}
such that k1 = 1 and log(kj+1) = log(kj) + r
where r = 0.1 is the degree class size. This leads to
C1 = {1}, C2 = {2}, C3 = {3}, C4 = {4, 5}, etc.,
until C41 = {19953, . . . , 25117}. Then, to compare degree
distributions, we plot for a given degree class C, the
distribution on all time slices Ti of the fraction fi(C). In
other words, we study how the fraction of couples (t, v)
which have a degree within C during Ti is distributed among
all time slices.
Figure 5 shows the distributions for classes C1, C2, C19,
C22, C31 and C41. In accordance with temporal homogeneity,
we can see that most fractions are distributed around the
mean and that only a few are distant from it. As expected
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Fig. 5: Distributions of fractions fi(C) on all time slices Ti for degree class C in {C1, C2, C19, C22, C31, C41} - Distributions on C1,
C2 and C19 are homogeneous with outliers. These classes are labelled as AN -classes. Distributions on C22, C31 and C41 are peaked on
zero since in most time slices there are no couple (t, v) in the corresponding class. They are labelled as A-classes.
according to the heterogeneity of degrees, the higher the
degree class, the lower the fraction of couples (t, v) within
the class. We see on C1 that the average fraction over all
time intervals is 2.1 · 10−3. When switching to C2, it drops
to 1.15 · 10−4 and gradually decreases to reach 0 in classes
of degrees above 252. In these high degree classes, the spike
on fraction 0 indicates that in most time slices, there is no
couple (t, v) reaching such high degrees. Note that this is a
peculiarity of this dataset, one or multiple nodes could have
a constant high degree and lead to a nonzero average fraction
(see Section IX). In the following, we will refer to these
classes as A-classes since they only contain abnormal traffic.
In opposition, classes having an average fraction greater than
0, which contain abnormal traffic and normal traffic, will be
referred to as AN -classes.2
In order to validate fractions fi homogeneity over time
slices within each degree class, we fit their distributions
with a normal distribution model P (x) = 1√
2piσ2
e−
1
2
( x−µ
σ
)2
where values are normally distributed around a mean µ
with a standard deviation σ. Deciding whether a given
distribution is homogeneous with outliers or not may be
done as follows [27]: (1) Iteratively remove outliers from the
distribution with Grubbs test [18]; (2) Fitting the resulting
distribution with the normal model; (3) Evaluate the goodness
of the fit. We use Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to
determine which model parameters fit the best the empirical
2In practice, we do not observe homogeneous classes without outliers, hence
the lack of N -classes.
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Fig. 6: Fit of fractions distribution on C2 after removing outliers
with Grubbs test - The KS distance between the fit and the empirical
distribution is below the critical value. Hence, this distribution is
flagged as an homogeneous distribution with outliers (AN -class).
distribution and evaluate the goodness of the fit with the KS
test between empirical and estimated distributions. In this
framework, we find 37 distributions that are homogeneous
with outliers among the 41 corresponding to each degree
class (see Figure 6). The remaining 4 classes are discarded
from the study, we call them R-classes for rejected classes.
One may use more complex and accurate techniques to
automatically perform the fit, see for instance the work
performed by Motulsky et al. [34].
Given an homogeneous distribution with outliers, we use
here the classical assumption that a value is anomalous if
its distance to the mean exceeds three times the standard
deviation [13], [21]. In classes displayed in Figure 5, we
obtain 151 time slices flagged as anomalous in the first class
containing degree 1 only, 5 anomalous time slices in C2
and 12 in C19. In A-classes, peaked on 0, anomalous values
correspond to all values greater than 0.
All in all, our method for event detection from degree
distributions is the following: we group degree values into
degree classes of logarithmic width. For a given degree class
C, we look at the distribution on all time slices of the fraction
fi(C). This distribution indicates anomalous values which
means that there are anomalous high numbers of couples
(t, v) having degree within C during specific time slices Ti.
We then call an anomalous value of this kind a detected event
and denote it (C, Ti).
A detected event gives two pieces of information: the time
slice Ti on which the anomalous value has been observed,
and the degree class C in which the couples responsible for
the high fraction are located. At this stage, we detected 1,358
such events. However, a time slice and a degree class are not
sufficient information to accurately characterize the anomaly.
We now address the goal of identifying couples (t, v) in T×V
responsible for these detected events.
VII. ITERATIVE REMOVAL TO IDENTIFY EVENTS
A detected event (C, Ti) is a degree class C and a time
slice Ti such that the fraction fi(C) is unusually high
compared to the ones in other time slices. Identifying this
event means recovering the set I(C, Ti) of couples (t, v)
responsible for this anomaly. In this section, we introduce
an iterative removal method and show that it leads to such
identification.
Let us take event (C2, T1080) as an example. We have access
to the set of couples (t, v) which have a degree in C2 during
T1080. However, we cannot directly identify the event by this
set. Indeed, let us consider the new link stream L′ in which
we removed the corresponding interactions: L′ = (T, V,E′)
with E′ = E \ {(t, uv) : t ∈ T1080 and dt(v) ∈ C2}. We see
in Figure 7 that the removal of this set of interactions from
the link stream causes the appearance of a negative outlier3
in the distribution of fractions on C2. Thus, by removing all
interactions (t, uv) such that couples (t, v) have degree in C2
during T1080, we removed anomalous traffic but also normal
traffic. Therefore, identifying the detected event (C2, T1080)
as the set I(C2, T1080) = {(t, v) : t ∈ T1080 and dt(v) ∈ C2}
is not accurate enough.
This suggests that one cannot directly identify couples
acting abnormally in AN -classes. Indeed, in these classes,
the normal fraction is greater than zero. Hence, an anomalous
fraction consists in anomalous couples but also normal ones,
which prevents us from identifying responsible couples
3We call negative outlier an outlier which is lower than the mean.
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Fig. 7: Incorrect identification in AN -classes - The removal of
all interactions (t, uv) such that dt(v) is in C2 during the detected
time slice T1080 causes the appearance of a negative outlier. Note
that the resulting fraction on T1080 is not zero since the removal of
some interactions has decreased the degree of nodes in higher classes
which end up having a degree in C2.
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Fig. 8: Event identification in A-classes - The removal of an
identified event in the A-class C41 allows the identification of an
event detected in the AN -class C1.
without disrupting normal traffic.
On the contrary, in A-classes the expected fraction is
zero. Therefore, couples (t, v) contributing to non-zero
fractions are clearly anomalous. Events detected in such
degree class C can therefore be correctly identified with
the set I(C, Ti) = {(t, v) : t ∈ Ti and dt(v) ∈ C}.
Thus, we now consider A class C41. Its larger
anomalous fraction corresponds to time slice T315.
Hence, this event can be identified by the set
I(C41, T315) = {(t, v) : t ∈ T315 and dt(v) ∈ C41}.
Figure 8 shows the consequences of the removal of these
abnormal couples activities. As expected, the anomalous
fraction in C41 vanishes without creating a negative outlier.
Additionally, we notice the disappearance of event (C1, T315).
Indeed, removed nodes v were linked to an unexpectedly large
number of nodes having degree 1 before the removal. Then,
the removal of the set I(C41, T315) leads to the identification
of event (C1, T315) such that I(C1, T315) = {(t, u) : t ∈
T315, u ∈ Nt(v), dt(v) ∈ C41 and dt(u) ∈ C1}, where
Nt(v) is the set of neighbours of v at time t.
All in all, our approach for event identification is
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Fig. 9: Distributions of fractions on all time slices for degree
classes C1 and C2 after event removals - Before event removal
there were 151 anomalous values in C1 and 5 in C2. After removal,
it only remains 10 unidentified anomalous values in C1 and 2 in C2.
the following. For each detected and identified event
(C, Ti) in A-classes, we remove abnormal activities
of couples (t, v) ∈ I(C, Ti) such that on the n
th
removal, we consider the link stream Ln(V, T,En) with
En = En−1 \ {(t, uv) : t ∈ Ti and dt(v) ∈ C} and E0 = E.
In addition to removing anomalous traffic identified in
A-classes, this process allows to identify related events in
AN -classes as well. If a given removal creates a negative
outlier in a degree class, this means that we removed too
much. The removal that caused it is then cancelled and the
corresponding event stays detected but unidentified.
In our dataset, none of the removals generated negative
outliers (this is not what we observe for all datasets, see
Section IX). Altogether, we directly identified and removed
205 events in A-classes. These removals allowed us to
identify a total of 1, 163 outliers on the 1, 358 previously
detected ones, hence more than 85% of detected outliers. To
do so, we removed 7.4% of all the traffic. We can see in
Figure 9 the final shape of classes C1 and C2 in which almost
all outliers disappeared. Figure 10 shows the degree profiles
of 4 nodes which have been removed for time periods during
which they were acting abnormally.
VIII. VALIDATION
The IP traffic trace we use does not have a ground truth
dataset listing abnormal IP addresses and instants. However,
we can validate our results by looking at the consequences of
the removals on the average degree per second.
Let dt be the instantaneous average degree at time
t: dt =
1
V
∑
v dt(v). The average degree during second
si = [i, i+ 1], denoted by d(si), is the average of dt from
t = i to t = i+ 1, for all i ∈ {0, · · · , 3599}:
d(si) =
∫ i+1
i
d(t) dt .
We see in Figure 11.a that the average degree per second
is homogeneously distributed with outliers. After removing
events identified with our method, we see in Figure 11.b
that peaks as well as sudden changes in the trend disappear,
while the average over time stays unaltered. Likewise, in
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Fig. 10: Degree profiles of four identified nodes - v1 is responsible
for outliers observed in C22 = {252, ..., 2510}. The set {(t, v1) : t ∈
[712, 940[ and dt(v) ∈ C22} has been identified and removed. v2
has a normal activity with a degree around 160 and a sharp variation
on T223 = [446, 448[. The set {(t, v2) : t ∈ T223 and dt(v) ∈ C32}
has been identified and removed. Sets {(t, v3)} where v3 is active
have all been identified and removed. For node v4, the four peaks
corresponding to degree values higher than 300 have been identified
and removed. The degree profiles of these nodes suggest that they
constitute malicious activity [22], [32]. Node v3 reaches several
powers of two indicating that it is running network scans. We observe
a similar behaviour around a degree of 256 for node v1.
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Fig. 11: Consequences of event removals on the average degree
per second - Our method succeeds in removing identified anomalies
with no significant impact on the underlying normal traffic.
the distribution, all outliers disappear but the bell curve
stays the same. Quantitatively, we find 33 outlying seconds
before removals versus 5 after applying our method. The
average over time of the average degree per second is equal
to 3.39571 · 10−4 before removals, and to 3.31795 · 10−4
after removals. These results show that our method succeeds
in removing abnormal traffic without altering the underlying
normal traffic.
These results highlight another important fact. An outlier
in distribution of Figure 11.a means that there is a second
during which the average degree is larger than usual. This
event is detected but not identified since we cannot trace back
responsible nodes with this aggregated feature. By using the
instantaneous degree on couples (t, v), our method is able
to identify events unidentified with the average degree per
second. This last result is particularly promising: it shows
that by using more complex and less aggregated features, it is
possible to identify events previously detected but unidentified
with simpler metrics. Then, the 195 events that we were not
able to identify with the instantaneous degree of nodes could
therefore be identified in future works by using other link
stream features.
IX. OTHER DATASETS
To test the generality and applicability of our method, we
test it on other datasets from the MAWI archive. In this section,
we present the main results and differences we observe with
these datasets.
A. One day long IP traffic trace from June 2013
We use here a one day long IP traffic capture from the
MAWI archive from June 25th, 2013, at 00:00 to June 26th,
2013, at 00:00. The set D contains 2, 196, 079, 591 triplets
involving 15, 390, 238 different IP addresses. This dataset is
larger than the first one and covers one day of IP traffic with
its circadian cycle. We keep identical time slices size and
degree classes size.
Figure 12.a (left) shows, for C2 = {2}, the distribution on
all time slices Ti of the fraction fi(C2). Partly as a result of
circadian cycles, we see that this distribution consists of three
normal distributions. To address this issue, we normalize the
degree with the average degree per second and consider the
normalized degree, denoted by dt(v), such that
dt(v) =
dt(v)
d(⌊t⌋)
,
where ⌊t⌋, the floor function of t, is the second to which t
belongs. We see in Figure 12.a (right) that local distributions
on time slices are similar and in Figure 12.b that the global
normalized degree distribution is heterogeneous. Thus, the two
constraints required to apply our method are met. We find 34
degree classes, from C1 = {1} to C34 = {3982, . . . , 5011}.
Among these, 3 classes are rejected because they do not fit
with an homogeneous distribution with outliers. We find 11
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Fig. 12: Results on a one day long IP traffic trace - After
degree normalization, both the similarity of local distributions and
the heterogeneity of the global distribution are verified. Results are
validated by the average degree per second after removals in which
the normal traffic is preserved. Note that in the global distribution
(b), the normalized degree has been rescaled with a constant to have
a better range of values and values are merged into bins to smooth
the distribution.
AN -classes from k = 1 to k = 26 and 20 A-classes from
k = 51 to k = 5011. We detect 22, 669 outliers and succeed in
identifying 63% of them. To do so, we removed 8.7% of all the
traffic. Once again, we see in Figure 12.c that these removals
lead to the cleaning of the average degree per second: 1, 672
abnormal seconds before removals and 10 after. Likewise,
normal traffic stays unchanged: the average over time of the
average degree per second is equal to 1.53199 · 10−5 before
removals and to 1.48824 · 10−5 after.
B. Fifteen-minute IP traffic trace from November 2018: com-
parison to MAWILab
We use here a fifteen-minute IP traffic capture from the
MAWI archive on November 3rd, 2018, from 14:00 to 14:15.
The set D contains 64, 913, 871 triplets involving 16, 453, 608
different IP addresses. This dataset is more recent than the
first one and has a list of anomalies indexed by MAWILab
[17] to which we can compare our results. Given the shorter
temporal extent, we take time slices of size τ = 1.0s instead
of τ = 2.0s, in order to keep a significant number of time
slices. Degree classes stay unchanged.
We observe an heterogeneous global degree distribution
and similar local degree distributions on time slices of 1.0
seconds (see Figures 13.a and 13.b). We find 43 degree
classes, from C1 = {1} to C43 = {31623, . . . , 39810}.
Among these, there are 23 AN -classes, 17 A-classes and 3
R-classes.
Contrarily to previous datasets, we observe three AN -
classes in high degree classes: C24 = {399, . . . , 502},
C27 = {795, . . . , 1001} and C40 = {15849, . . . , 19953}.
We can see in Figure 13.d, that this is due to three
nodes which have a constant degree fluctuating within each of
these classes and, as a result, form the observed normal traffic.
In this dataset, several removals generated negative
outliers. For instance, the removal of event (C40, T752)
generated a negative outlier in class C1. The
corresponding event was incorrectly identified by the
set I(C40, T752) = {(t, v) : t ∈ T752 and dt(v) ∈ C40}.
Indeed, this event corresponds to the spike of activity of node
v3 from 755.3 to 756.5 (see Figure 13.d). Yet, the normal
behaviour of v3 is to be linked to an average of 18, 178
nodes of degree 1 over time. Thus, the removal of its activity
during this time period leads to a negative outlier in C1,
since, in addition to removing abnormal interactions of v3,
it also removes its legitimate interactions. This shows that to
identify event (C40, T752), we need to use a finer and more
complex feature than the degree.
Finally, our method enabled us to detect 827 outliers and
identify 796 of them (96%). To do so, we removed 1.2%
of all the traffic. We see in Figure 13.c that, as with the
two other datasets, removals lead to a traffic free of most
degree-related anomalies. The number of abnormal seconds
is equal to 19 before removals versus 0 after removals.
Likewise, the average over time of the average degree per
second goes from 9.311934 · 10−5 to 9.198076 · 10−5 after
removals.
This dataset contains a MAWILab database to which we
can compare our results [17]. It lists and labels anomalies
in traffic from the MAWI archive by using a graph-based
methodology that compares and combines the output of
several independent anomaly detectors. On November 3rd,
2018, from 14:00 to 14:15, it indicates a total of 287
anomalous IP addresses. To each of these is associated a
time period during which it is evaluated as abnormal and
a label classifying its anomaly type among the following
categories [32]:
– Point to point denial of service: a large number of packets
are sent between two IP addresses;
– Distributed denial of service: a large number of packets are
sent between multiple sources and one destination;
– Network scan: an IP address scans a network of several
destination IP addresses;
– Port scan: an IP address scans several ports of one
destination;
– Point multipoint: normal router traffic;
– Alpha flow: normal peer to peer traffic;
– Other: normal outage traffic;
Since we do not consider the port number, and given that the
degree feature does not account for the number of exchanged
packets, anomalies within the point to point denial of service,
port scan and alpha flows categories cannot be detected by our
method. Moreover, we do not consider events corresponding
to legitimate traffic. This reduces the number of identified IP
addresses to 77.
With our method, we find 33 anomalous IP addresses. Six
of them are not listed by MAWILab. They correspond to node
v2 in Figure 13.d and nodes v4, v5, v6, v7 and v8 in Figure
13.e (left). Node v2 has been removed during its spike of
activity from 798.18 to 799.87. Likewise, node v7 has been
removed from 814.06 to 815.00 and node v8 on the whole
time period during which it is active. Note that, as we can see
in Figure 13.e (middle and right), nodes v7 and v8 activities
are typical of nodes performing network scans which are
usually detected by MAWILab. The remaining three nodes
v4, v5 and v6, have been removed on periods of respectively
0.0768s, 0.0677s and 0.181s because of their ephemeral
activity within the A-class C22 = {252, . . . , 317}. This could
be avoided by using larger classes (see section X-B).
In the network scan category, we identified 24 IP addresses
among the 76 (32.6%) listed by MAWILab. All network
scans involving more than 250 different destinations have
been identified with our method. As mentioned above, we
identified in addition two IP addresses that the MAWILab
detectors missed (see Figure 13.e). Moreover, for the
corresponding events, our temporal precision is much better
than the one provided by MAWILab detectors. However,
our method fails to identify IP addresses permanently linked
to the network since they have constant degree profiles and
therefore lead to AN -classes. More generally, we did not find
IP addresses which scan networks involving less than 250
destinations since all classes below C22 = {252, . . . , 317}
are AN -classes, and since their activities are not linked to
the ones of removed events. Nonetheless, time slices during
which most of these network scans occur have been detected
as outliers in their corresponding degree class. This inability
to identify low degree classes events could be avoided by
using a feature different from the degree, in which the
corresponding malicious activities deviate more significantly.
In the distributed denial of service category, only one
anomaly is identified by MAWILab. The corresponding node
have a maximum degree of 53. Hence, we do not find it with
our method for the same reasons as above.
The six remaining nodes we identified fall in the point to
multipoint category that we do not consider as it constitutes
normal router traffic.
Finally, Figure 13.c (right) shows the average degree per
second after removing events identified with our method as
well as the ones identified in the MAWILab dataset. We see
that, with MAWILab, the average over time is affected by
the removals. This is mostly due to the poor time precision
used by MAWILab to describe anomalies. Indeed, 63% of
IP addresses are identified as abnormal on the whole trace,
including IP addresses which have a global constant degree
with only a few spikes. With our method, instead, when nodes
a) Global degree distribution
10−16
10−14
10−12
10−10
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100 101 102 103 104 105
F
ra
ct
io
n
o
f
(t
,v
)
s.
t.
d
t(
v
)
=
k
F
ra
ct
io
n
o
f
(t
,v
)
s.
t.
d
t(
v
)
>
k
Degree k
b) Similarity of local degree distributions
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
−0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
F
ra
ct
io
n
o
f
(f
i,
f j
) i
6=
j
RatioDi,j/c
c) Time evolution of the average degree per second
A
v
er
ag
e
d
eg
re
e
p
er
se
c.
×
1
0
−
4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Time t (seconds)
Before Removals
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Time t (seconds)
After Removals
MAWILab
d) Constant and high degree nodes
10−1
100
101
102
103
104
105
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
d
t(
v i
)
t
v1
v2
v3
e) Nodes undetected by MAWILab
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
d
t(
v i
)
t
C22
v4, v5, v6
v8
v7
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
t
v7
MAWILab + our method
Our method only
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
t
v8
MAWILab + our method
Our method only
Fig. 13: Fifteen minutes from November the 3rd 2018 - (a - b) The heterogeneity of the global degree distribution and the similarity of
local degree distributions are verified. (c) Results are validated by the average degree per second after removals. Contrary to our method,
we observe a decrease of the average over time when removing events identified by MAWILab. (d) AN -classes are observed in high degree
classes: v1 is responsible for the normal traffic observed in C24 = {399, . . . , 502}; v2 for the one in C27 = {795, . . . , 1001} and v3 for the
one in C40 = {15849, . . . , 19953}. (e) Nodes v2, v4, v5, v6, v7 and v8 are not detected by MAWILab. However, we see that the removal
of the abnormal activity of v2 is responsible for the disappearance of the spike around t = 800 in (c) and that v7 and v8 have a suspicious
activity which is usually detected by MAWILab. Note that high degree node v3 in (d) has been removed from the calculation in the average
degree per second in (c) to have a greater clarity.
have a constant degree, classes within which their degree
fluctuates are labelled as AN -classes. Thus, their activities
are not removed and normal traffic stays unchanged.
X. INFLUENCE OF PARAMETERS
We showed the efficiency of our method on several datasets.
In this section, we perform a series of experiments on the first
dataset to study the influence of parameters τ , for time slice
duration, and r, for degree class size.
A. Variation of Time Slice Sizes
We divide the link stream into time slices of size τ in
order to compare local degree distributions. The success of
our method is based on the fact that they are similar from
one time slice to another. Due to aggregation over a larger
period, it is expected that the larger τ , the larger the similarity
between time slices, and conversely when the size decreases.
Let Iτ = ∪i,j I(Cj ,Ti) be the set of identified outliers using
time slices of size τ . In order to evaluate the impact of τ ,
we measure the Jaccard similarity coefficient between I2.0,
obtained in the first experiment, and other sets obtained by
varying τ :
J(I2.0, Iτ ) =
|I2.0 ∩ Iτ |
|I2.0 ∪ Iτ |
.
Results are depicted in Figure 14.a. We see that identified sets
Iτ are identical from τ = 0.2 up to τ = 20.0. This shows that
our method is stable with respect to this parameter. Below
this range, we are able to identify slightly more outliers. On
the contrary, when the size increases, we identify less and less
outliers until no more is identified after τ = 175.0. This is
explained by the number of AN , A and R-classes according to
τ in Figure 14.b: the more τ increases, the higher the number
of R-classes and the lower the number of A-classes in which
we are able to identify events. When we reach τ = 175.0,
all classes are rejected, hence no outlier is detected. This
increase in the number of rejected classes is provoked by
the very small number of time slices when τ gets larger.
Indeed, time slices are insufficiently numerous to establish a
normal behaviour and, for all classes C, fits between fractions
fi(C) and a normal distribution are more likely to be rejected.
We identify more abnormal couples (t, v) when τ is small.
However, this result should be taken with caution. As we
can see in Figure 14.b, when τ decreases, the number of
rejected classes increases and the number of AN -classes
decreases. Indeed, the smaller the time slice, the less the
behaviour between time slices is similar, which leads to a
rejection of normal behaviour. A-classes are not affected:
in most time slices, there is no node that reaches a degree
within the class, whatever the time slice size. Moreover, their
number increases. This is explained in Figure 15. We see
that for τ = 0.25, there is 83% of Ti for which the fraction
fi(C34) is zero, against 67% for τ = 2.0. When τ decreases,
the proportion of time slices without traffic in the class
compared to the ones that contain traffic is much higher than
in experiments with a larger τ . If the increase of A-classes
makes it possible to identify more outliers, the decrease of
AN -classes, on the other hand, prevents us from determining
if a removal is bad or not by the appearance of a negative
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Fig. 14: Time slice size influence - (a) The Jaccard index between identified sets shows that our method is stable from τ = 0.2 to τ = 20.0.
(b) Small time slices lead to an increase of the number of A and R-classes while large time slices lead to a high number of R-classes but
small number of AN and A-classes. (c) The computation time significantly increases as τ decreases.
3400
3600
3800
4000
4200
1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 1318
d
t(
u
)
t
C34
τ = 2.0
τ = 0.25
τ
0.25 2.0
Detected (C34, T5256), (C34, T5257) (C34, T657)
outliers (C34, T5258), (C34, T5259)
Identified {(t, v) : t ∈ [1314, 1315[ {(t, v) : t ∈ [1314, 1316[
outliers and dt(v) ∈ C34} and dt(v) ∈ C34}
Removal u from 1314.24 to 1314.95 u from 1314.24 to 1314.95
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Node u has abnormal traffic within degree class C34. In the sample,
there are 4 time slices with abnormal traffic out of 24 using τ = 0.25
and 1 time slice with abnormal traffic out of 3 using τ = 2.0. This
influences the proportion of A-classes but not the temporal precision
on which the outlier is removed: with τ = 0.25 (red dots), we remove
u from 1314.24 to 1314.25 (T5256), then from 1314.25 to 1314.75
(T5257,T5258), and finally from 1314.75 to 1314.95 (T5259). With
τ = 0.25 (black triangles), we remove u from 1314.24 to 1314.95
(T657).
outlier. Hence, our validation criteria for removals cannot be
applied which could lead to a disruption of normal traffic.
In addition, we see in Figure 14.c that using small time
slices significantly increases computation time.
Finally, note that, thanks to the modelling of traffic as a
link stream, the time slice size does not affect the temporal
precision with which we identify events since the time period
during which a node is within an A-class is the same whatever
the considered time slice (see Figure 15).
B. Variations of the Degree Class Size
We divide local degree distributions into degree classes of
size r. The success of our method is based on the fact that
distributions of fractions fi(Cj) on all time slices Ti and
degree classes Cj are homogeneous.
First notice that due to class construction, the total number
of classes is very large when r is small and decreases rapidly
when r increases (see Figure 16.a). For r = 10−5, there are
23, 983 classes; for r > 1.6, the total number of classes is
smaller than 4 and reaches 1 for r > 4.4. Consequently, the
smaller r, the higher the computation time.
When we look at the size and similarity of identified sets,
we observe several phenomena (see Figure 16.b):
1) the number of identified outliers increases for r < 0.2;
2) we do not identify outliers for r ∈ [2.2, 2.3] and r > 4.4;
3) the Jaccard index is higher than 0.8 for r ∈ [10−5, 1.6]
and r ∈ [2.4, 3.3];
4) the Jaccard index fluctuates between 0.8 and 1 for
r ∈ [0.2, 1.6];
5) the number of identified outliers drops from r = 1.7,
increases from r = 2.4, then drops again from r = 3.4.
Once again, these observations are linked to the proportions
of the three classes types. We explain them in detail in the
following.
When the degree class size is too small, classes do not
longer integrates degree fluctuations (see Figure 17). As we
can see in Figure 16.c, this leads to an increase of A and
R-classes at the expense of AN -classes which decrease. As
above, while the increase of A-classes makes it possible
to identify more outliers (observation 1), the decrease of
AN -classes prevents us from using our validation criteria
for removals which could lead to a disruption of normal traffic.
On the contrary, when the degree class size is too large,
classes integrate too much traffic. As a consequence, we
can see in Figure 16.c, that the more r increases the more
A-classes decreases. Therefore, the more r increases, the less
we identify outliers. This is how we explain observation 2:
a) Computation time and number of classes
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c) Consequences on AN , R and A-classes
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Fig. 16: Degree classes size influence - (a) Due to the large number of classes, the computation time significantly increases as r decreases.
(b) The Jaccard index between identified sets shows that our method is stable from r = 10−5 to r = 1.6. (c) Small degree classes lead to
an increase of the number of A-classes and to a decrease of the number of AN -classes. For r < 0.02, the proportion of R-classes is higher
than the one of AN -classes. For r > 0.2, proportions of A and AN -classes are similar and the proportion of R-classes is low. Note that
we did not plotted the proportion of classes for r > 1.4 because of fluctuations due to the small number of classes.
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Fig. 17: Consequences of small classes - When r = 0.01, classes
are too small and do not contain fluctuations. As a consequence,
for r = 0.01, we observe 6 AN -classes and 4 R-classes instead of
only one AN -class for r = 0.1. Note that this node comes from the
dataset of November 2018.
for r = 2.2, there are two AN -classes; for r = 2.3; there
are one AN -class and one R-class; and finally, for r > 4.4,
there is only one AN -class. Moreover, we see in Figure 18
that when class C1 contains several values of degrees, the
resulting distribution looks the same as when it only contains
degree 1. Hence, the large proportion of couples (t, v) having
degree 1 obstructs the traffic of couples (t, v) which have
a degree larger than 1. As a consequence, we detect less
outliers and incorrect removals could be accepted which
could also lead to a disruption of normal traffic.
Finally, observations 3, 4 and 5 are explained by
discretization effects. In the one-hour traffic trace, classes are
arranged such that low degree classes are AN -classes and
high degree classes are A-classes. Let kid be the smallest
degree from which we are able to identify events. As we can
see in Figure 19, kid is different depending on the chosen r.
The smaller kid, the larger the number of detected outliers.
Until r = 0.2, kid is lower than 250 and the number of
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Fig. 18: Class C1 depending on r - There are numerous couples
(t, v) which have degree 1: when C1 also contains degrees larger
than 1, we see no difference between the corresponding distributions.
Therefore, for r > 0.3, we detect the same outliers as with r = 0.1,
since outliers for which dt(v) > 1 are included within the Gaussian.
Note that we zoomed on the Gaussian for greater clarity.
identified outliers is maximal. Then, kid fluctuates between
250 and 2, 512, which explain observation 4. A lot of outliers
are located within this range. Hence, if kid ∈ [250, 2512],
these outliers are identified, otherwise they are not, which
explains observation 3. Regarding observation 5, this is what
happens: for r ∈ [1.7, 2.1], the number of classes is equal
to three. There are two AN -classes and one A-class. The
smallest degree of identification kid increases with r which
causes the drop in the number of identified outliers. For
r ∈ [2.2, 4.3], the total number of classes is two. The number
of detected outliers depends on classes proportions: there
are either two AN -classes (r = 2.2), or one AN -class and
one R-class (r = 2.3), or one AN -class and one A-class
(r ∈ [2.4, 4.3]). Finally, we observe the same phenomenon,
for r ∈ [2.4, 4.3], kid increases with r which causes the
drop of the number of identified outliers until only one class
remains for r > 4.3.
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Fig. 19: Smallest degree of identification according to r - When
kid ∈ [250, 2512], the Jaccard index is higher than 0.8. However,
when kid > 2512, the number of identified outliers drops (dashed
red line) and reaches 0 in shaded zones.
The method instability with respect to r is only observed
for a number of classes lower than 4 (r > 1.6). For a number
of classes ranging from 24, 000 (r = 10−5) to 4, the method
is stable and exhibits very similar results. Therefore, r must
be chosen based on data range, by keeping a reasonably high
number of classes.
XI. CONCLUSION
When dealing with IP traffic, we are faced with IP addresses
having very different behaviours. In this context, one question
arises: how to differentiate normal behaviours from abnormal
ones. In this paper, we proposed a solution to this issue.
We introduced a method that detects outliers in IP traffic
modelled as a link stream by studying the degree of node
over time. We applied our method on three datasets from
the MAWI archive: one-hour long IP traffic trace from June
2013, one-day long IP traffic trace from June 2013 and a
fifteen-minute long IP traffic trace from November 2018.
Likewise, we performed series of experiments by varying the
parameters used. In all these situations, we obtained stable
results pointing interesting anomalous activities in IP traffic,
independently of the degree order of magnitude. Moreover,
we surgically removed anomalous traffic, which allowed us to
validate our identification, identify more subtle outliers and
recover a normal traffic with respect to the degree feature.
This work however is only a first step towards anomaly detec-
tion in link streams and may be improved on several aspects.
We could extend our method with more complex features
than the degree in order to find more complex anomalies
and to identify the remaining events unidentified with the
degree. This task would be simplified by the fact that largest
anomalies have already been removed from the remaining
traffic, allowing for a more detailed and finer analysis. At
broader scale, our work could be useful in the field of IP
traffic modelling as we would be able to generate normal
traffic according to a specific feature. Likewise, thanks to
their individual extraction, anomalies could also be studied
separately for a better characterization.
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